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VIRGINIA V. BLACK,
123 S. CT. 1536 (2003)
FACTS
On August 22, 1998, respondent Barry Black led a Ku Klux Klan
rally on private property with the owner's permission.' At the conclusion of
the rally, the crowd burned a large cross several hundred yards from a road.2
Rebecca Sechrist, who watched the rally, reported that the cross-burning
caused her to feel "awful" and "terrible."3  A sheriff arrested Black and
charged him with burning a cross in violation of Virginia's cross-burning
statute.4 The statute (Section 18.2-423) provides that cross-burning with the
intent to intimidate any person or group of persons is a class C felony.5 It
further states that "[a]ny such burning of a cross shall be prima facie
evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons. 6 The trial
judge instructed the jury that intent to intimidate requires a motive to
intentionally place a person in fear of bodily harm and that "the burning of a
cross by itself is sufficient evidence from which you may infer the required
intent."7 The jury found Black guilty and fined him $2500.8
Respondents Richard Elliott and Jonathan O'Mara attempted to burn
a cross on the yard of their neighbor, James Jubilee. 9 Jubilee, an African-
American, had previously complained to Elliott's mother about her son's
backyard firing range.'0 On May 2, 1998, Elliot and O'Mara retaliated by
burning a cross on Jubilee's property."  The next morning, Jubilee
discovered the partially burned cross and became "very nervous," fearing
future incidents. 12 Elliot and O'Mara were charged with attempted cross-
burning and conspiracy to commit cross-burning. 3 O'Mara pled guilty to
both counts, but reserved the right to challenge the constitutionality of the
cross-burning statute.'
4
During Elliot's trial, the judge instructed the jury that the
Commonwealth had to prove that the defendant actually intended to commit
cross-burning, that he did an act in furtherance of this intent, and that he




VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1996).
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7 Virginia v. Black 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1542 (2003).
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intended to intimidate people.'5 The court did not define the meaning of
"intimidate" nor include the prima facie evidence provision of Section 18.2-
423.16 The jury found Elliott guilty and sentenced him to ninety days in jail
and a $2500 fine.'
7
The Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed both convictions. 8 On
appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court held Section 18.2-423 unconstitutional
on its face because it was indistinguishable from a similar type of ordinance
found unconstitutional in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul.'9 The court held that
Section 18.2-423 discriminated on the basis of content of speech.20 In the
alternative, the court decided that the prima facie evidence section made the
statute overbroad, increased the probability of prosecution, and effectively
chilled free speech.2'
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court held that Section 18.2423 was
constitutional because it banned all cross burning with intent to intimidate
and did not limit the intimidation to defined groups or opinions.22 A plurality
held that the prima facie evidence provision rendered the statute
unconstitutional on its face as interpreted in the jury instructions at
respondent Black's trial.23 The Court affirmed the Virginia Supreme Court's
ruling to vacate respondent Black's conviction.24 The Court also vacated the
judgment of the Virginia Supreme Court and remanded the cases of
respondents Elliott and O'Mara for further proceedings.25
ANALYSIS
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, began the opinion by
reciting the history of the Ku Klux Klan and cross-burning in the United




19 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). The Court examined a local ordinance that
banned symbolic conduct that would arouse "anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion, or gender." Id. at 380. The Court held that the city of St. Paul could not impose
special prohibitions on speakers who expressed views on certain disfavored subjects, such as race, color
or creed but ignore other speech which also provoked violence, such ideas that expressed hostility towards
political affiliation or sexual preference. See id. at 391-93.
20 Virginia v. Black 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1543 (2003).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1549.
23 d. at 1541.




States. The Court found that people employed cross-burning as a means to
threaten or intimidate others, as well as to warn the viewer of future threats
of violence. 2 6 Additionally, the Court found that a burning cross is a symbol
of hate no matter who conveys the message and regardless of whether the
message is political or intended to intimidate.27
The Court noted that the government may not prohibit certain ideas
even if most of society finds the idea offensive, disagreeable, or false.28 This
protection applies to both symbolic or expressive conduct as well as actual
speech.29 In earlier cases, the Court had held that the First Amendment's
protections are not absolute and that the government may regulate certain
types of speech when an overriding societal interest in order or morality
exists. 30 For example, the government can restrict speech that causes injury
or incites a breach of the peace. 3' Additionally, the government may prohibit
fighting words that provoke a violent reaction and true threats that
communicate an intention to perform unlawful violence aimed at a particular
person or group.
32
The Court held in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul that "when the basis for
the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class
of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of viewpoint
discrimination exists. 3 3 For example, the government may prohibit threats
of violence against the President because all threats of violence against the
President are outside First Amendment protection. 4 However, the state
could not prohibit speech that is constitutionally protected, such as outlawing
threats against the President based solely on political views, because the
prohibited speech would not be classified on the reason that the entire class
of speech was proscribable3
After reviewing the restrictions on free speech and its opinion in
R.A. V., the plurality found Section 18.2-423 constitutional because the
26 Id. at 1545.
27 Id. at 1546-47.
28 Id. at 1547.
29 Id.
30 Id. See e.g. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
31 Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1547 (2003) (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572).
32 Id. at 1547-48 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969)).
33 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
34 Id. The Court in R.A. V. provided two more examples of proscribable subcategories of speech.
In the first example, the Court said that a state might choose to prohibit only that obscenity which is the
most patently offensive in its prurience. This is known as the core prurience example. The final example
stated that the government may regulate price advertising in one industry but not another because of the
risk off fraud. Fraudulent speech does not have any First Amendment protection. These three examples
constitute what has become termed the particularly virulent speech exception. Id.
25 Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1549.
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statute banned all cross-burning with intent to intimidate.36 Unlike the local
ordinance in R.A. V, which concerned banning conduct that aroused anger
based on race, color, creed, religion, or gender, the Virginia statute did not
discriminate on the basis of content.37 Anyone who bums a cross in Virginia
with the intent to intimidate breaks the law, without any limitations.3" The
Court found that Virginia could constitutionally ban cross-burning with
intent to intimidate because cross-burning is a particularly virulent form of
intimidation.39 Therefore, because Virginia could prohibit all intimidating
messages, Virginia could choose to regulate this subset of messages due to
the history of violence associated with cross-burning and the likelihood to
inspire fear.4°
After ruling on the constitutionality of Section 18.2-423, the Court
examined the statute's prima facie evidence provision. The Virginia
Supreme Court had not interpreted the meaning of this provision and
therefore the Court relied on the jury instruction used in respondent Black's
trial. 4' The trial judge had instructed the jury that the burning of a cross
created prima facie evidence from which the required statutory intent could
be inferred.42 The plurality held that the prima facie evidence provision
allowed a jury to convict a defendant in almost every case, especially when a
defendant chose not to put on a defense. 43 The provision appeared to allow
one to be found guilty solely because he or she burned a cross, without any
inquiry into the defendant's intent.44
Therefore, the Court found the prima facie evidence provision
unconstitutional because it prohibited many types of constitutional free
speech and created an unacceptable risk of suppressing ideas.45 The
instruction failed to distinguish between cross-burning done to intimidate and
cross-burning done for any other reason.46 The Court held that because the
interpretation of the prima facie evidence provision within the jury
instruction was unconstitutional, the provision in Section 18.2-423 was
unconstitutional on its face.47 The Court stated, however, that the lower
36 Id. at 1548.
37 Id. at 1549-50 (citing RA. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)).
39 Id. at 1548.
39 Id. at 1549-50.
40 Id. at 1549.
41 id. at 1550.
42 Id.
43 id.
" Id. at 1550-51.
45 Id. at 1551.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1552.
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courts may interpret the provision in a different manner to avoid the Supreme
Court's constitutional objections.48
The Court thus affirmed the Virginia Supreme Court's holding that
respondent Black's conviction could not stand. 9 'Additionally, the Court
vacated the Virginia Supreme Court's judgment regarding respondents
Elliott and O'Mara and remanded their cases for further proceedings.50
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINIONS
Justice Scalia's opinion focused on the overbreadth analysis of
Virginia Code Section 18.2-423. He wrote separately to explain why no
justification existed for the decision to invalidate the statute on its face due to
the prima facie evidence provision.i Justice Scalia first examined what
constitutes prima facie evidence. Virginia defines prima facie evidence as
evidence that suffices, on its own, to establish a particular fact. 52 According
to Justice Scalia, this definition allowed the defendant to present rebuttal
evidence to the jury.53
Justice Scalia stated that in an overbreadth analysis, the Supreme
Court normally examines whether individuals who engage in protected free
speech may be convicted, as opposed to arrested or prosecuted.54 He noted
that the plurality's approach correctly focused on the question of
conviction. 55 However, he argued that the plurality wrongly concluded that
the possibility of these convictions facially invalidated Section 18.2423.6
Justice Scalia stated that the only people that the plurality deemed to be
convicted wrongly were those who chose not to present a defense.
57
According to Justice Scalia, this small class of people did not give rise to an
overbreadth challenge because this class did not produce a substantial
number of impermissible applications.58 Justice Scalia recognized that while
some innocent individuals may be subject to conviction, they may still
challenge their convictions on a case-by-case basis.59
Justice Scalia next argued that the Court incorrectly based its





52 Id. at 1553.
53 Id.




59 Id. at 1555-56.
59 d. at 1554.
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instructions. 60 He knew of no cases in which an ambiguous statute became
interpreted solely by a jury instruction and he argued that jury instructions
that do not state the law correctly should be refused, instead of treated as
binding.6' According to Justice Scalia, the Court would normally adopt an
alternative reading if available to make the statute constitutional. 62 In this
case, Justice Scalia would have relied on the Virginia Supreme Court's
interpretation, namely that prima facie evidence only assisted the
Commonwealth and did not allow the jury to ignore rebuttal evidence.63
Justice Scalia would have permitted the Commonwealth to retry Black under
a different jury instruction rather than vacating Black's conviction and
dismissing the indictment against him.64
Justice Souter disagreed with the majority because Section 18.2-423
did not qualify for the virulence exception provided within R.A. V. v. City of
St. Paul.65 The Court in R.A. V provided this virulence exception to allow
content based subclasses of categorically proscribable expression if that
subcategory was based completely on the reason the entire class of speech at
issue was proscribable.66 According to Justice Souter, none of the three
examples of the virulence exception provided in R.A. V resembled the
present case.67 First, he concluded that no similarity between Section 18.2-
423 and the core prurience example existed.68 He reasoned that although the
Virginia legislature might have prohibited cross-burning due to its power to
intimidate, it may also have done so due to disapproval of the message of
white supremacy, which would not qualify as a general proscription against
intimidation.69 Justice Souter then found that the third example dealt with
commercial speech and was not applicable in this case.70
Justice Souter then looked at the second virulence exception
example, which concerns threats aimed at the President.7' He stated that
courts view threats against the President with an objective standard based on
the threat of violence and not by reference to the content of the message or
viewpoint of the messenger. 72  However, a content-based proscription of
cross-burning appeared to Justice Souter to be a subtle effort not only to ban
60 Id. at 1557.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 1557-58.
64 Id. at 1558-59.
65 Id. at 1559.
66 RA. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
67 Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1560 (2003).
68 Id. (referring to R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 388).
69 Id.
70 Id. (referring to R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 388-89).
71 Id. (referring to R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 388).
72 Id. (referring to R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 388).
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intimidation caused by cross-burning but also the ideology of white
supremacy broadcasted by non-threatening cross-burning.73 Justice Souter
concluded that Section 18.2-423 failed to fit within the second example
because R.A. V's virulence exception does not allow prohibitions associated
with a particular viewpoint.74
Justice Souter stated that the Court's decision appeared to modify the
third exception in R.A. V rather than the virulence exception.75 The third
exception allows a subcategory for content based discrimination within a
proscribable category if no official suppression of ideas occurs and that the
category is "not a ruse for message suppression."76 He said that the prima
facie evidence provision within the statute attempted to suppress ideas from a
particular ideology and noted that, even without the provision, the statute
would sufficiently prosecute those who bum crosses with intent to
intimidate.77 He viewed the prima facie evidence provision as an attempt to
skew jury deliberations toward convictions in cases where only weak
evidence of intent to intimidate existed or where a defendant provided only
an ideological reason for burning a cross. 78 The provision would "thus tend
to draw nonthreatening ideological expression within the ambit of the
prohibition of intimidating expression. ,
79
Because Section 18.2-423 did not fall under any of the R.A. V.
exceptions, the statute would only survive if narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.80 Justice Souter found that it did not. Therefore,
because the content-based distinction within Section 18.2-423 was invalid at
the time of the arrests, Justice Souter believed that the three convictions
should have been overturned.8'
DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Thomas concluded that the Court erred when it found an
expressive component to cross-burning in its use of R.A. V's exception to the
First Amendment's prohibition on content-based discrimination.82 Justice
Thomas stated that Section 18.2-423 banned only conduct, not expression,
73 Id.
74 Id.






1 Id. at 1562.
82 Id. at 1563.
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and therefore should not be analyzed under a First Amendment test. 3
Treating cross-burning as speech, rather than conduct, ignores the history of
cross-burning and its association with terrorist groups like the Ku Klux Klan.
Justice Thomas provided examples of the association of cross-burning with
violence and the way that cross-burning instills in the victims a well-
grounded fear of physical violence.84 He noted that even the legislative
history behind Section 18.2-423 suggested that the legislature chose to ban
the conduct of burning crosses rather than racist expression behind cross-
burning.8 5 Because the statute only regulated conduct, Justice Thomas stated
that there was no need for the Court to analyze the statute under any First
Amendment test.
8 6
Even if Section 18.2-423 implicated the First Amendment, Justice
Thomas found the inference of intent in the statute's prima facie evidence
provision constitutional.8 7 The presumption in the jury instruction created a
"statutorily supplied inference" that did not compel a specific conclusion or
shift the burden of production.88 Inferences are constitutional unless "no
rational trier could make a connection permitted by the inference. 89 Justice
Thomas stated that it was not possible to not make a connection between
cross-burning and intimidation after examining the history of cross-
burning.90 He stated that Section 18.2-423 resembled other types of statutes
in which legislators found certain behavior so reprehensible that they created
an irrebuttable presumption of intent, such as laws regarding drug
distribution and statutory rape.9'
Justice Thomas next addressed the plurality's concern that people
who lacked the intent to intimidate would nevertheless be arrested and
prosecuted prior to the instructions stage of an actual trial.92 Justice Thomas
did not find this problem compelling because the Court upholds regulations
regarding the freedom of speech even when the conduct initially appears
culpable, but results in dismissed charges.93 For example, pornographers
who traffic images of adults that appear to be images of minors may be
arrested and prosecuted for child pornography even if the jury later finds the
materials to be legal.94
93 Id.
84 Id. at 1564.
s5 Id.
86 Id. at 1566.
87 Id. at 1564.
8s Id. at 1566-67.
89 Id. at 1567.
9 Id.
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Justice Thomas concluded that the First Amendment must give way
to other interests in certain situations.95 He stated, however, that the plurality
erred by finding that people sometimes bum crosses without intent to
intimidate. 96  He disagreed that cross-burning could sometimes be just
"unwanted communication" because he saw cross-burning as almost always
a physical threat.97
CONCLUSION
The Court's opinion in Virginia v. Black clarifies case law regarding
proscribable speech and provides support for the Court's opinion in R.A. V.
In addition, the Court guides state legislatures in creating constitutional
statutes that prohibit cross-burning. Finally, the Court furthers the interests
of minorities while protecting the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of
speech.
The Court's opinion fits squarely within the holdings of past First
Amendment cases. The holding revitalizes the historical opinion provided in
Chaplinski v. New Hampshire,9" where the Court stated that certain types of
speech, including fighting words or lewd speech, do not fit within First
Amendment protections.99 The Court's holding in Black also echoes the
opinion in Roberts v. US. Jaycees,'0° in which the Court held that "stated
violence or other types of potentially expressive activities that produce
special harms distinct from their communicative impact. .. are entitled to no
constitutional protection."' 0 ' Finally, the opinion clarifies the virulence
exception in R.A. V. 1
02
The Virginia Supreme Court did not correctly interpret the Court's
opinion in R.A. V The court wrongly found Section 18.2-423
unconstitutional, mistakenly interpreting R.A. V. as a prohibition on all forms
of content-based discrimination within a proscribable area of speech. 0 3 As
discussed, the First Amendment does allow for content-based discrimination
when the basis for the discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the




98 Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
" Id. at 571-72.
1oo Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
101 Id. at 628.
102 Several lower courts had correctly interpreted R.A.V.'s examples; if the Court had ruled
differently these decisions would have been overturned. See, e.g., People v. Stanistreet, 58 P.3d 456 (Cal.
2002); Ohio v. Thompson, 767 N.E.2d 251 (Ohio 2002).
103 Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1549 (2003).
104 Id.
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Virginia Supreme Court's ruling, states could not regulate subsets of
outrageously intimidating messages even if the entire type of speech failed to
fall under First Amendment protection. An opposite ruling by the Supreme
Court would have potentially lessened the protections of minorities:
particularly threatening crimes in which minorities tend to be the victims,
such as cross-burning with the intent to intimidate, would not have been
specifically outlawed and special sanctions on those who use particularly
virulent speech could not have been imposed.
By allowing states to create statutes that proscribe cross-burning
with intent to intimate, the Court protects minorities from those who seek to
terrorize them. A key point of the Court's opinion was that the cross-burning
statute outlawed all cross-burning with intent to intimate, not just cross-
burning executed with animus against minorities. However, this overarching
ban against all cross-burning with intent to intimidate carries the implication
that minorities will be protected since many cross-burnings are intended to
intimidate minority victims. In future cases involving symbolic speech or
content-based discrimination, a statute will be found constitutional if the
specific speech outlawed falls under a class of proscribable speech.
To protect the victims of cross-burning after Black, states must
ensure that their statutes fit within R.A. V.'s virulence exception and that their
statutes ban all cross-burning with intent to intimidate, without limitations
regarding content. For example, both Idaho's and Montana's cross-burning
codes include provisions prohibiting cross-burning based on certain
characteristics such as race, color, or involvement in civil rights activities.1
0 5
A court could find this unconstitutional for the same reasons that the Court
found the ordinance in R.A. V unconstitutional. To comply with the
virulence exemption, a statute cannot contain special prohibitions on
speakers who express views on certain disfavored subjects. 0 6 If the statute
does have special prohibitions, the law is no longer proscribable for the
reason that the entire type of speech is proscribable.
In addition to complying with the virulence exception, states should
also re-examine any prima facie evidence provisions of their statutes. For
example, Connecticut's cross-burning statute could be problematic because it
automatically deems the burning of a cross on public property or private
property without the owner's permission an illegal discriminatory practice.
0 7
Like Section 18.2-423's unconstitutional prima facie evidence provision,
Connecticut's statute fails to examine the cross-burner's intentions. A
105 IDAHO CODE § 18-7902 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-221 (2003).
106 R.A.V.v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
107 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-58 (2003).
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defendant who fails to put on a defense may therefore be convicted, whether
or not the defendant intended to discriminate.
One must remember that the First Amendment's protection of free
speech must remain sacred, even while protecting minorities. For example,
Justice Souter failed to see that Section 18.2-423 correctly only criminalized
those acts outside of the First Amendment's protections. He stated that the
legislature might have singled out cross-burning in the statute based on a
disapproval of the message of white supremacy and not based on cross-
burning's power to threaten. Because the Court found the prima facie
evidence provision unconstitutional, however, a jury must now find that the
accused intended to intimidate the alleged victim. Thus, Justice Souter
misunderstood that pure ideologist speech would not be outlawed; only
intimidating speech that has no First Amendment protection would be.
Section 18.2-423 protects all people, not just minorities, from
intimidation, a type of true threat that should not be afforded any First
Amendment protection. In the R.A. V hearings before the Supreme Court,
attorney Tom Foley argued, "The First Amendment was never intended to
protect an individual who bums a cross in the middle of the night in the
fenced yard of an African-American family's home."'08 Cross-burning is
"nothing short of domestic terrorism" according to Virginia's Attorney
General Jerry W. Kilgore.'09 Section 18.2-423 "involves two important
freedoms-freedom of speech and freedom from fear. [Virginia's] statute
preserves the first and secures the second."" 0
Summary and Analysis Prepared By:
Angela R. Ernst
los EDWARD J. CLEARLY, BEYOND THE BURNING CROSS 173 (1994).
'09 Edward Walsh, State Bans on Cross Burning Upheld, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2003, at Al.
110 Id.
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